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LEGISLATIVE NOTE
JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITIES OF FOREIGN STATES
INTRODUCTION

Jurisdictional or sovereign immunity which is a part of and is derived
from the broad concept of sovereignty, is a principle in international law'
and legal history 2 that has 'been the subject of continual critical study.8
In preventing courts from establishing jurisdiction over a foreign state or
its property, absolute sovereign immunity 4 necessarily bars execution on
1. Cf. Lauterpacht, The Problem of JurisdictionalImmunities of Foreign States,
28 BEaT. Y.B. INT'L L. 220, 221-22 (1951) [hereinafter cited as Lauterpacht].
[A] considerable majority of states have departed from that assumed
rule [of absolute immunity] of international law, at least to the extent
of exercising jurisdiction over foreign states in matters jure gestionis, without, as a rule, giving occasion for protest on the part of the foreign states
concerned. Accordingly, in so far as the actual practice of states may be
said to be evidence of customary international law, there is no doubt that
the principle of absolute immunity forms no part of international custom.
[Ilt is by no means certain that immunity from execution is an inevitable or universally recognized rule of international law.
Id.
2. E.g., The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
3. This is understandable considering the impact this principle has on a nation's
ability to resolve legal conflicts over matters in which it may have an interest in
another nation; and the impact this principle has on a state's foreign relations.
4. Sovereignty is that broad, umbrella-like concept that attaches to nationhood
and is the basis of all the immunities that inure to a foreign state and prevent jurisdiction over that state in another nation's courts. There are three forms of "immunity" arising from the concept of sovereignty: (1) the rule of individual immunities which applies to diplomatic and consular representatives; (2) the act of state
doctrine which applies to governmental acts of a foreign state in that state's own
territory-a foreign locus (see note 51 infra); (3) jurisdictional or sovereign immunity which relates to the acts and effects of acts of a foreign state in and on
another state. From the principle of jurisdictional or sovereign immunity, two conflicting theories of immunity have arisen: absolute jurisdictional or absolute sovereign immunity (or simply absolute immunity) and restrictive jurisdictional or restrictive sovereign immunity (or simply restrictive immunity). Schematically, the
immunities might appear as follows:
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a judgment against a state.' Inconsistencies have developed in the practice of invoking immunity from jurisdiction. Neither the federal nor the
domestic state courts have been uniform in their application of immunity
and the State Department 'has frequently been arbitrary in its suggestion
of immunity.0
In January of 1973, the Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee,
Congressman Peter W. Rodino, Jr., introduced in the House of Representatives "A Bill to define the circumstances in which foreign states are
immune from the jurisdiction of United States courts . . ." and in which
execution on a foreign state's assets will be prohibited. 7 The measure,
H.R. 3493, is Congress' first attempt at codifying -the legal principles surrounding grants of jurisdictional immunity to foreign states.
The proposed legislation is an effort to clarify the conditions under
which another nation either will or will not be accorded jurisdictional
immunity. The legislation is necessary for two reasons: the confusion
caused by relevant decisions and the separation of powers question.8 Additionally, H.R. 3493 would contribute to a more uniform application of
international law in United States courts. The United States would also
join an increasing number of nations which have either established statuSovereignty
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5. Note, The Castro Government in American Courts: Sovereign Immunity
and the Act of State Doctrine,75 HARv. L. REV. 1607 (1962).
The use of the term state throughout this note will refer to a foreign nation and
not to a domestic state of the United States unless otherwise specified. Use of the
word court or courts refers to both domestic state and federal courts unless otherwise specified.

6.

See discussion in text at notes 28-57 infra.

7. H.R. 3493, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973). Congressman Rodino and Congressman Edward Hutchinson introduced the bill which was sent to Subcommittee No.
2 of the Judiciary Committee where hearings were held June 7, 1973. H.R. 3493
is the same as the draft bill submitted to the Speaker of the House by the Secretary

of State and the Attorney General in January of 1973. In the Senate, Senators
Hugh Scott and Roman Hruska introduced the same measure, S. 566. The bill was
not acted upon during the First Session of the 93d Congress.

8. That is, executive interference in the judicial branch through State Department suggestion of immunity for a foreign state.
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tory norms or have accepted guidelines clarifying the circumstances under
which -a nation will be immune from jurisdiction. 9 This note will consider
these matters in the analysis of the proposed legislation.
I.

HISTORY

Traditionally a sovereign state has been immune from suits in its own
courts. 10 Likewise, whether for reasons of comity or convenience, a foreign state has been immune from suits in another state's courts."
Sovereign immunity is a vestige of an era when a king or emperor was
the embodiment of a sovereign state and could not be subject to even
a reprimand. 12 Though that notion has been abandoned, other reasons
and justifications for the principle of sovereign immunity have been substituted. One reason is simply comity among nations.' s Oppenheim, in
criticizing jurisdictional immunity, attributed the concept to "principles of
equality, of independence, and of dignity of States.' 4 Avoiding "possible
embarrassment to those responsible for the conduct of the nation's foreign
relations" is another consideration.' 5 Yet, more recently, acceptance of
sovereign immunity seems to be due more to judicial precedent and executive policy than to any clearly defined rationale.' 6
9.

Council of Europe: European Convention on State Immunity, 11 INT'L LE470 (1972); Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee, 3d Sess.
(Colombo 1960).
10. "A sovereign cannot be sued in his own courts without his consent." United
States v. Diekelman, 92 U.S. 520, 524 (1875). This principle was reaffirmed in
United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882). Those instances or areas in which cases
have been brought against the United States were done so where consent had been
granted. E.g., under the Federal Torts Claim Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671 to 2680
(1970), action against the government can be brought because Congressional conGAL MATERIALS

sent has been given.
In The Beaton Park, 65 F. Supp. 211, 212 (W.D. Wash. 1946), the court noted

that "when our Government enters upon an ordinary commercial business undertaking, . . . it does so under the same liabilities and responsibilities as private individuals . . .;and Congress has given consent for the institution of legal actions by
those aggrieved ....
11. The Parlement Belge, [1880] 5 P.D. 197; U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/245 (1971)

(the Secretary-General's "Survey of International Law").

C.f. Convention on Pri-

vate International Law ("Bustamante Code"), 86 L.N.T.S. 111.
12. Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria General, 336 F.2d 354, 357 (2d Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965).
13. The Carlo Poma, 259 F. 369, 370 (2d Cir. 1919), vacated 255 U.S. 219

(1920) ("international comity [is] due from one sovereign to another").
14. H. LAUTERPACHT, 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAw 272 (8th ed. 1955)
[hereinafter cited as OPPENHEIM).
15. Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria General, 336 F.2d 354, 357 (2d Cir.
1964).
16. National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 358-59, reh. denied,
349 U.S. 913 (1955); see Wacker v. Bisson, 348 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1965).
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The concept of and theory behind sovereign immunity may have originated with Bartolus' maxim, "par in parem non habet imperium."'1 7 In
effect, that has come to mean that any foreign state is prima facie immune from jurisdiction in another's courts. Interestingly, some classical
international law scholars never referred to state immunity from jurisdiction. Indeed, Grotius, often called the "father of international law,"
8
makes no mention of the term.'
The principle of sovereign immunity was first recognized in the United
States in The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon in 1812.10 In that case,
France "nationalized" a vessel owned by two Americans. When the ship
entered the harbor of Philadelphia for repairs, they sued for its return.
The Court held that the ship was an "armed national vessel" of a foreign
nation and not subject to suit. 20 Later sovereign immunity was held to
21
encompass all ships owned by a sovereign friendly to the United States,
and the principle has been confirmed and broadened in subsequent
22
cases.
The broadening of the concept of sovereign immunity to include the
immunity of property or assets other than merchant vessels of other states
was perhaps the most significant aspect of jurisdictional immunity, both
historically and procedurally. Whether the property or assets at stake
were serving a diplomatic or other function, the property or assets
23
were generally immune from attachment for jurisdictional purposes.
Moreover, property was immune from execution even if a court could get
in rem jurisdiction-for example, through a counterclaim-and the plain24
tiff in the counterclaim was able to win the verdict.
17.

"[An equal does not have control over an equal." Lowenfeld, Claims against

Foreign States-A Proposalfor Reform of United States Law, 44 N.Y.U.L. REV. 901,

930 n.85 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Lowenfeld].
18. Lauterpacht at 228.
19. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).

20. Id. at 135. In dicta, Chief Justice Marshall suggested that a foreign state's
immunity might be broader than that. Id. at 142.
21. Berizzi Bros. Co. v. Steamship Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926); accord, The
Pampa, 245 F. 137 (E.D.N.Y. 1917). Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 68 (1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT II].
22. E.g., United States v. Guaranty Trust Co., 60 F. Supp. 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1945),

modified, 161 F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1947) (an attorney's claim for fees for services
rendered to the Soviet Union precluded by sovereign immunity). See generally RESTATEMENT I § 65.
23. Loomis v.Rogers, 254 F.2d 941 (D.C.Cir. 1958) (where the government
of the foreign state did not waive its immunity, the court has no jurisdiction to attach funds from a sale which the plaintiff sought as payment for legal services performed for the Italian government).
24. Dexter & Carpenter, Inc. v. Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen, 43 F.2d 705 (2d Cir.
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In Hannes v. Kingdom of Roumania Monopolies Institute,25 the New

York Supreme Court, Appellate Division determined that a state-owned
corporation was immune only if it was operated for governmental purposes. A distinction was made between acts of a private nature, fus gestionis, and acts of a public nature, jus imperii.26 This distinction-the
first step in the erosion of absolute immunity-led to a change in the
American practice relating to jurisdictional immunity, namely executive
suggestion of immunity, 27 which change, in turn, raised the problem of
separation of powers.
The most blatant expression of executive suggestion was and still is interference by the State Department with the judicial branch. Compania
Espanola v. The Navemar held that if a claim of immunity is "recognized
and allowed, . . . it is then the duty of the courts to release the vessel

upon appropriate suggestion by the Attorney General"28 ; but where the
Department of State declines to make a suggestion, the courts may determine the question of immunity. Ex Parte Peru held that the Supreme
Court had jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus compelling release of
a vessel owned by a foreign state where the State Department had recognized 'that nation's claim to immunity. 29 But one of the most flagrant
executive interferences with the courts was the prevention of the service
of process on a Cuban ship by Coast Guardsmen who were acting under
orders. Here the court held that valid service of process could not be
prevented but a claim of immunity must be granted if recognized by the
executive. 0 Executive incursion, however, became more pronounced
with the increasing limitation of absolute immunity.
Absolute immunity was functional at one time in that it prevented frivolous actions against a state and was helpful in maintaining foreign rela1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 896 (1931) (where a sovereign consented to be sued
through a counterclaim and lost the counterclaim, the state was still immune from

execution).
25. 260 App. Div. 189, 20 N.Y.S.2d 825, appeal denied, 260 App. Div. 1006,
24 N.Y.S.2d 994, order resettled, 260 App. Div. 1058, 26 N.Y.S.2d 856 (1940).

26. 260 App. Div. 189, 197, 20 N.Y.S.2d 825, 833.
27. Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943) (the judicial branch must
abide by the executive branch's suggestion of immunity; a ship owned by Peru was
seized for in rem jurisdiction but the State Department recognized a claim of sovereign immunity); accord, Isbrandtsen Tankers v. President of India, 446 F.2d
1198 (2d Cir. 1971). See Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945);
Compania Espanola de Navegacion Martima, S.A. v. The Navemar, 303 U.S. 68

(1938). For a recent case reaffirming executive suggestion of immunity, see Spacil
v. Crowe, 489 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974).
28. 303 U.S. at 74.
29. 318 U.S. 578 (1943).

30. Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A. (The M/V Bahia de Nipe), 197 F. Supp. 710
(E.D. Va.), alj'd, 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961).
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tions. Few, for example, doubt the need for definitive law concerning
diplomatic s ' or consular3 2 immunity. But the entrance of foreign governments into commercial and private ventures raised objections as to the
legitimacy of immunity in all cases. Questions arose such as whether
a foreign state should be immune from suit for breach of contract or what
recourse the plaintiff has if the breaching party has -absolute immunity.
Concern for individual rights and the public welfare as well as the increasingly private acts of governments prodded American courts to restrict
or at least to articulate their discontent with claims of absolute immunity.33 Even where a court recognized a claim of immunity, the court did
84
so grudgingly.
Legal scholars-and dissenting judges 3 5-were even more outspoken in
their opposition to absolute immunity. Oppenheim felt that the "grant
of immunity from suit amounts in effect to a denial of a legal remedy
in respect of what may be a valid legal claim; as such, immunity is open
to objection." 6 Lauterpacht not only objected to the principle but felt
it was not a principle of international law at all.37 He based that view
on the fact that most nations had abandoned the principle and where they
had not, immunity depended on reciprocity. Sir Hersh also added,
"States do not make the observance of established rules of international
law dependent upon reciprocity."3 3
Andreas Lowenfeld has written that the application of the doctrine of
immunity in the United States is a confusing mass of cases, policies, mis31. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, April 18, 1961, 500 U.N.T.S.
95, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.20/14/add. 1.
32. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, April 24, 1963, 596 U.N.T.S.
261, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 25/16/add. 1.
33. Larson v. Domestic and Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 703
(1949); Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria General, 336 F.2d at 357; Republic
of Iraq v. First Nat'l City Trust Co., 207 F. Supp. 588, 591 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), appeal dismissed, 313 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1963); Kingdom of Norway v. Federal Sugar
Refining Co., 286 F. 188, 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
34. Larson v. Domestic and Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. at 682, 703. "It
is argued that the principle of sovereign immunity is an archaic hangover not consonant with modern morality and that it should therefore be limited wherever possible. There may be substance in such a viewpoint as applied to suits for damages."
(This case involved the sovereign United States but the criticism is valid whether
the sovereign is the United States or another state.) Id.
35. E.g., Justice Musmanno's dissent in Chemical Natural resources, Inc. v. Republic of Venezuela, 420 Pa. 134, 170, 215 A.2d 864, 881, cert. denied, 385 U.S.
822 (1966). See also Judge Mack's opinion in The Pesaro, 277 F. 473 (S.D.N.Y.
1921).
36. OPPENHEIM at 273.
37. Lauterpacht at 221.
38. Id. at 228.
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understandings and procedural defects.3 9 Lowenfeld's proposal is similar
to the draft legislation presently before Congress40 and under consideration here.
The judicial and scholarly dissatisfaction resulted in the concept of restrictive immunity. Where the act was commercial in nature, jus gestionis, a foreign state could not claim immunity; but where the act was
41
public or governmental, jus imperii, the claim of immunity was allowed.
The two types of immunity, absolute and restrictive, created a confusion
which, combined with the frequent intrusion of foreign policy questions
into the judicial arena, led the State Department, in cooperation with
the Justice Department, to attempt clarifying the situation by issuing the
42
"Tate Letter."
Noting that many countries were abandoning absolute immunity for restrictive sovereign immunity, the "Tate Letter" said that it would be the
policy of the State Department "to follow the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity in the consideration of requests of foreign governments for
a grant of sovereign immunity."' 43 One of the reasons for the change,
apart from the practice of other nations, was that, both in theory and
practice, a foreign state could get more favorable treatment in United
States courts than could the federal government itself. Though an early
court decision had already pointed out the problem, 44 the "Tate Letter"
emphasized the fact that the courts did not always take this "favoritism"
39. Lowenfeld at 901.
The law applied in the United States to claims against foreign states is
at present an amalgam of judicial decisions, Executive Branch policies,
some uncertain notions of international law and wholly inadequate procedure. As governments increasingly engage in activities that bring them
into contact with private parties in the United States and elsewhere, the
defects of current United States law and practice concerning claims
brought in this country against foreign states become more and more apparent and important.
Id.
40. H.R. 3493. Lowenfeld's proposal does differ in one significant way. Lowenfeld was against strong execution provisions in his proposal unlike H.R. 3493.
Lowenfeld at 928, 936-38.
41. Hannes v. Kingdom of Roumania Monopolies Institute, 260 App. Div. 189,
196-97, 20 N.Y.S.2d 825 (1940).
42. 26 DEP'T STATE BULL. 984 (1952) (named after the Department's Acting
Legal Advisor, Jack B. Tate).
43. Id. at 985. "mhe granting of sovereign immunity to foreign governments
in the courts of the United States is most inconsistent with the action of the Government of the United States in subjecting itself to suit in these same courts in both
contract and tort and with its long established policy of not claiming immunity in
foreign jurisdictions for its merchant vessels." Id.
44. The Beaton Park, 65 F. Supp. 211, 212 (W.D. Wash. 1946).
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into account and that, therefore, a justifiable reason existed for restricting
absolute immunity.
Nevertheless, the "Tate Letter" still failed to solve two problems. The
first was that it did not eliminate the executive department's role in the
judicial determination of immunity. Indeed, it seems the purpose of the
"Tate Letter" was just the opposite:
It is realized that a shift in policy by the executive cannot control the
courts but it is felt that the courts are less likely to allow a plea of sovereign immunity where the executive has declined to do so. There have
been indications that at least some Justices of the Supreme Court feel that
in this matter courts should follow the branch of the Government charged
with responsibility for the conduct of foreign relations. 45

Before the "Tate Letter" cases had held that in order for a state's claim
to immunity could be recognized, the executive department must advise
the courts as to whether or not a claim is valid. Generally such a suggestion of immunity was felt to be binding on the courts. 46 Since 1952
when the "Tate Letter" was issued, the case law has followed this viewpoint. 47 When the executive department fails or refuses to suggest immunity, however, authority indicates that the court is free to decide the
48
legitimacy of a claim.

Clearly a significant separation of powers problem exists in the confusion over jurisdictional immunity. Though it is not the purpose of this
note to explore that issue, it is relevant to briefly consider the matter.
Under "Tate Letter" policy, the practice of the State Department, theoretically, is to suggest or not to suggest immunity to the courts on the
basis of jus imperii or jus gestionis.49 State Department suggestion of im45.

36 DEP'T STATE BULL. 985 (1952).

46. Cases cited supra note 27.
47. National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 360 (1955); Spacil
v. Crowe, 489 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974); Flota Maritima Browning de Cuba v. Motor Vessel Ciudad, 335 F.2d 619, 623 (4th Cir. 1964); United States v. Anchor
Line, Ltd., 232 F. Supp. 379, 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A.,
197 F. Supp. 710, 725 (E.D. Va. 1961); Chemical Natural Resources, Inc. v. Republic of Venezuela, 420 Pa. 134, 143, 215 A.2d 864, 868, cert. denied, 385 U.S.
822 (1966).
48. Compania Espanola de Navegacion Maritima, S.A. v. The Navemar, 303 U.S.
68 (1938); Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria General, 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir.
1964); Flota Maritima Browning de Cuba v. Motor Vessel Ciudad, 335 F.2d 619,
623 (4th Cir. 1964); Gonzalez v. Industrial Bank (of Cuba), 33 Misc. 2d 283, 284,
227 N.Y.S.2d 456, 458 (Special Term N.Y. County 1961) (where the court said
that the State Department's "failure or refusal to suggest immunity is accorded significant weight"). See National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356
(1955).
49. 26 DEP'T STATE BULL. 984 (1952).
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munity amounts to an executive interference which also takes on other
forms. 50 H.R. 3493 would confront this problem by transferring any
question of a foreign state's immunity to the courts. 5' Freeing the courts
from executive incursion would make them more effective instruments of
international law since concern over foreign policy questions and political
motives, characteristic of the executive branch, is not normally of interest
52
to the courts.
The proposed legislation would also free the State Department from
being suspected of political motives for not suggesting immunity. As the
50. Prevention of the service of process is an example.
51. Parenthetically, the same problem of executive suggestion exists with the act
of state doctrine. In Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897), Justice Fuller
gave his classic definition of the doctrine at 252: "Every sovereign State is bound
to respect the independence of every other sovereign State, and the courts of one
country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done in
its own territory."
Initially, the doctrine was clear if not absolute. However, the so-called "Bernstein
Exception" was the first major qualification. Bernstein v. New York Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954). The court in Bernstein held
that the act of state doctrine need not be applied where the executive department
determined that the government would not be harmed by not applying the doctrine.
In 1964, Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, through Justice
Harlan, clarified the doctrine without specifically ruling on the "Bernstein Exception." It seemed that the courts, when applying the act of state doctrine, would
be free of executive interference. That belief was shortlived because in 1972, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court in First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional
de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972), apparently adopted the "Bernstein Exception." He
concluded "that where the Executive Branch expressly represents to the Court that
the application of the doctrine would not advance the interests of American Foreign policy; [sic] that doctrine should not be applied by the Courts." Id.
See generally Falk, The Sabbatino Controversy, THE AFTERMATH OF SABBATINO
(L. Tondel ed. 1965); R. FALK, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE INTERNA-

TIONAL LEGAL ORDER (1964); Palmer, First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional
de Cuba, 10 GLOBE No. 1 (Ill. Bar Ass'n 1972). See also note 4 supra for schematic diagram of relationships among various immunities and act of state doctrine.
52. R. FALK, supra note 51. It is true that courts have frequently considered
international law outside their purview. See Bassiouni, Unlawful Seizures and Irregular Rendition Devices as Alternatives to Extradition, 7 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 25,
51 (1973):
[I]t is relatively simple for municipal courts considering [an] . . . issue
to deem themselves jurisdictionally unimpaired by violations of international law and to proceed with the case as if the violation of international
law did not exist.
The rationale sustaining this dichotomy between violations of internal
law and violations of international law is predicated on one interpretative
approach to the doctrine of separation of powers in municipal law. Under this approach violations of international law are deemed within the
prerogatives of the executive, not the judiciary, and, furthermore, municipal
courts assert that they have no enforceable sanctioning powers over such
violations; only the executive can deal with such questions.
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Acting Legal Advisor of the State Department put it, "foreign states are
sometimes inclined to regard a decision by the State Department refusing
to suggest immunity as a political decision unfavorable to them rather
than a legal decision." 5
The second problem which the "Tate Letter" failed to resolve was that
of determining which acts were public or private, governmental or commercial, jus imperii or jus gestionis. The courts have not exhibited consistency. While a foreign state's effort to equip an army through contractual
purchases in the United States was held to be a public act, 54 another state's
doing business through a corporation has been held to be private. 55 Likewise, the operation of a railroad by a foreign state was held to be a pubagency to promote tourism
lic function, 56 but the hiring of an advertising
57
in another country was said to be private.
A final problem which new legislation must resolve is that of an improved method of obtaining jurisdiction over a sovereign. Presently, jurisdiction is exercised by attachment of property (in rem) or assets (quasi
in rem). Both cause no small amount of trouble -and are not always possible; and neither is feasible in many cases, since execution is seldom permitted. In personam jurisdiction is virtually unheard of in jurisdictional
immunity cases. In the following analysis of H.R. 3493, jurisdiction is
more specifically examined as are the methods for the service of process.
II. THE PROPOSED LEGISLATION H.R. 3493
The Bill's fundamental purpose is to define those circumstances in
which a foreign state is immune from jurisdiction and free from execution.
Essentially the measure is the "Tate Letter" in statutory form5" but there
are significant and encouraging differences. Unlike the "Tate Letter" the
Bill would make the "question of a foreign state's entitlement to immunity
53. Hearings on H.R. 3493 before the Subcommittee (I1) on Claims and Governmental Relations of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 14
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
54. Kingdom of Roumania v. Guaranty Trust Co., 250 F. 341 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 246 U.S. 663 (1918).
55. Coale v. Societe Co-operative Suisse des Charbons, 21 F.2d 180 (S.D.NY.
1921).
56. Oliver American Trading Co. v. Government of the United States of Mexico, 5 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1924), cert. denied, 267 U.S. 596 (1925).
57. Harris & Co. Adv., Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 127 So. 2d 687 (Fla. App.
1961).
58. Letter from William P. Rogers and Richard Kleindienst to the Speaker of
the House, January 31, 1973, Hearings at 33-35. The effect of the Bill, in other
words, is to codify the distinction between jus imperii and jus gestionis.
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an issue justiciable by the courts, without participation by the Department
of State," 59 and would also introduce enforcement provisions for the execution of a judgment.60
A.

Section One of H.R. 3493

Section One of H.R. 3493 would insert a new chapter, chapter 97, into
Title 28 of the United States Code. 61 This section, comprised of §§
1602-1611, would set forth definitions, circumstances of and -theexceptions
to immunity from jurisdiction and execution as well as provisions for service of process.
Section 1602 declares the purpose of the Congress in passing the
Bill and states that all claims of immunity would be decided by the
courts in conformity with "this chapter and other principles of international law."0 2 The section quite definitely declares that under international law, states are not immune for acts arising out of commercial undertakings. The United Nations Secretary-General, in his "Survey of International Law," was not as certain of this assumption though he did
3
note that many nations adhere to the practice of restrictive immunity.
The other significant aspect of the measure is contained in the last sentence of § 1602. The drafters' intent in doing away with executive interference and avoiding acts as had occurred in Rich v. Naviera Vacuba,
S.A.,6 4 is clear.0 5
Commercial activity is defined as "a regular course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act." 66 However, in §
1603(b), the drafters add that the "commercial character of an activity"
59. Id.
60. As noted in the bill itself, the proposed legislation, if passed, would be subject to existing and future international agreements and treaties.
61. H.R. 3493, Section One. The title of the new chapter would be "Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States."
62. Id. at Section One, § 1602 [hereinafter the various sections of H.R. 3493's
chapter 97 will be cited as given in the bill].
63. U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/245 at 38. Lauterpacht and Oppenheim are not hesitant, however, in writing that the theory of restrictive immunity is a part of international practice. Lauterpacht, supra note 1 and OPPENHEM, supra note 14. The
Council of Europe's recent convention on jurisdictional immunity, the European
Convention on State Immunity, indicates that the principle of restrictive immunity
is part of customary international law, 11 INT'L LEGAL MATEMALS 470 (1972). See
also the Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee, 3d Sess. (Colombo 1960).
64. 197 F. Supp. 710 (E.D. Va. 1961) (prevention of the service of process under State Department orders).
65. § 1602.
66. § 1603(b).
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will be determined by the "nature of the course of conduct" rather than
by the purpose of the transaction. For example, a government contract
to purchase army boots would be considered commercial.6 7 Under the
proposed legislation, the court would have latitude in defining commercial
activity and would be able to decide questions of both law and fact regarding a claim of immunity. The important point here is that even if
difficulty remains in the definition of public and private acts, it will be
the court and not the executive who will decide. 6 8
Section 1603(a) defines foreign state to include political subdivisions
of foreign nations (such as state or provincial, 69 county or city governments) as well as agencies or instrumentalities 70 of the foreign state or
its subdivisions. This is noteworthy because a political unit of a state
71
generally has not been given immunity.
The proposed legislation starts with the premise that a foreign state
is immune from jurisdiction in federal and state courts.7 2 Section 1605
then enumerates when and where immunity from jurisdiction will not be
recognized.
Once a state has waived immunity "explicitly or by implication," there
can be no withdrawal of the waiver.73 For example, if a state has made
a general appearance to contest litigation, the state has impliedly waived
immunity.74 There are other important illustrations of implied waiver of
67. Hearings at 40. Whether the foreign government carries or regular commercial activity or undertakes the obligations of a single contract makes no difference.
If the activity is commercial in nature, immunity could not be claimed, no matter
the purpose of the activity.
68. "The central principle of the draft bill is to make the question of a foreign
state's settlement to immunity an issue justiciable by the courts, without participation
by the Department of State. As the situation now stands, the courts normally defer
to the views of the Department of State, which puts the Department in the difficult
position of effectively determining whether the plaintiff will have his day in court."
Letter from Rogers and Kleindienst to the Speaker of the House, Hearings at 34.
69. See Sullivan v. State of Sao Paulo, 122 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1941) (a state
or province is also immune from suit on general international legal principles).
70. For purposes of serving process and execution on assets, a qualification is
attached to defining foreign state as including agency or instrumentality. §§ 1608
and 1610. See discussion in text at notes 88-107 infra. For an example of the
British approach, see K.rajina v. The Tass Agency, [1949] 2 All E.R. 274 (Ct. App.).
71. RESTATEMENT II § 67. "It is believed, notwithstanding this ruling [Sullivan
v. State of Sao Paulo, 122 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1941 )],that reason supports the rule
stated in this Section [§ 67]." RESTATEMENT II at 205. The European Convention
on State Immunity, 11 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 470 (1972), does not recognize immunity for political subdivisions.
72. § 1604.
73. § 1605(1). This is unchanged from RESTATEMENT II § 70(1).
74. See, e.g., Flota Maritima Browning de Cuba v. Motor Vessel Ciudad, 335
F.2d 619 (4th Cir. 1964).
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immunity. A state has waived immunity where it has invoked the aid
of the courts but then claims immunity from a counterclaim. 75 Where
a provision for arbitration is contained in a contract between a state and
the injured party but the state refuses to arbitrate, § 1605(1) precludes
a claim of immunity.7" Explicit waiver of immunity would include waiver
of immunity by treaty or contract. This provision makes sense especially
77
where a contracting party relied on this contractual provision.
The second exception to a claim of immunity by a state is for "a commercial activity carried on in the United States."78 Section 1605(2) specifies those commercial activities that are not immune from jurisdiction.
An act "performed in the United States in connection with a commercial
activity

. . .

elsewhere" and acts which are performed outside the United

States but have "a direct effect" within the United States are not immune. 79 According to the State Department's legal advisor, the "jurisdictional standard" would be the same for a foreign state's activities as for
the activities of foreign private enterprise.8 0
Under the terms of § 1605(3), a foreign state would be unable to
claim immunity from jurisdiction in litigation in which
rights in property taken in violation of international law are in issue and
that property or any property exchanged for such property is present in
the United States in connection with a commercial activity carried on in
the United States by the foreign state ....

This section would, of course, also apply to property owned or operated
by an agency, instrumentality or political subdivision of the foreign
state. 8 ' A claim of immunity will not be allowed where the issue is over
75. See discussion in text at note 88 infra. See also § 1607. Cf. RESTATEMENT
U1§ 70(2).
76. Note, The Immunity of Foreign Sovereigns in U.S. Courts-ProposedLegislation, 6 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POLITICS 473, 476 (1973); accord, Pan American
Tankers Corp. v. Republic of Vietnam, 296 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
77. Note, 6 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POLITICS at 476-77, supra note 76. "It is
grossly unfair to deny a private party his day in court when the private party, in
entering into the contract with the foreign state, relied specifically on a provision
waiving sovereign immunity." Id.
78. § 1605(2). This is unchanged from RESTATEMENT II § 17.
79. This remains the same as RESTATEMENT II § 18. Cf. RESTATEMENT II §
69.
80. Hearings at 41.
81. A crucial question related to the rights in property issue is the effect of the
act of state doctrine. See note 51 supra. As stated above, the act of state doctrine
presents United States courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases resulting from
another state's acts on its own soil such as the expropriation of property.

Thus,
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United States and over proprights in immovable property located in the
's2
erty rights "acquired by succession or gift."
Tortious conduct by the foreign state or its representatives is the focus
of § 1605(5). The "Section-by-Section Analysis," submitted to the Congress by the State Department's legal advisor and contained in the Hearings on H.R. 3493, states that § 1605(5) is directed at traffic accidents
primarily but is also applied to other acts unrelated to commercial activities.8 3 According to international law, there is no consular immunity for
traffic accidents, for example, while there is diplomatic immunity for
these mishaps. 4 Nothing in § 1605(5) is contrary to international law.
In order to maintain the United States' "role as one of the principal
capital markets of the world," 8 5 H.R. 3493 allows a foreign state immunity
from jurisdiction of the courts in any case relating to the foreign state's
public debt. 86 This immunity does not exist, however, if either the sovereign state waives immunity or the public debt is that of a political subdi87
vision or agency or instrumentality.
In National City Bank v. Republic of China, the sovereign wanted "our
law" to apply but "free from the claims of justice," 8 that is, it brought
an action in the federal courts but invoked sovereign immunity when a
counterclaim was brought against it. Under § 1607, bringing an action
amounts to a waiver of immunity and that waiver stands if a counterclaim
is brought against the foreign state even though the counterclaim, if
brought first as an original action against the sovereign, would be barred
if there is property or assets of the expropriating state in the United States, the act
of state doctrine would preclude any action against that property or those assets.
Testimony of the State Department's legal advisor indicates that the act of state doctrine remains unaffected by the bill. "Since this draft deals solely with issues of
immunity, it in no way affects existing law concerning the extent to which the 'act
of state' doctrine may be applicable in similar circumstances." Hearings at 20. This
conclusion seems highly questionable. Judicial testing seems likely.
82. § 1605(4).
83. Hearings at 42. Where a remedy is already available for tortious acts under
the NATO Agreement, Article VIII, the foreign state's representative will be immune. § 1605(5).
84. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, April 18, 1961, 500 U.N.T.S.
95, 110; Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, April 24, 1963, 596 U.N.T.S.
261,298.
85. Hearings at 42.
86. § 1606(a). This public debt seems to include "not only direct bank loans
but also governmental bonds and securities.. .." Hearingsat 42.
87. § 1606(a) (1) and (2). Remedies existing under federal securities laws will
be preserved. § 1606(b).
88. 348 U.S. at 361-62.
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by immunity.8 9 Also, in the case of counterclaims which do not arise
from the same subject-matter, § 1607(2) does not allow immunity so long
as the relief sought is not different from the relief the foreign state is
asking for. In this regard, the proposed legislation is consistent with the
Restatement.90

Presently, the manner of serving process on a foreign state is unclear
because both executive and judicial policy have failed to establish the specific means by which such service could be adequately made. Part of
the problem is attributable to the fact that in rem jurisdiction-for example, attaching a contested ship of a foreign state-or quasi in rem jurisdiction-attaching the assets of a foreign state-are the only forms of
jurisdiction which have been sought. Under either of these forms, however, although the attachment may be effective for getting jurisdiction,
that attachment could not be made for purposes of execution. 91
H.R. 3493 radically departs from contemporary practice regarding service of process on and jurisdiction over a state in that it sets up a clear,
mandatory method of service, 92 establishes in personam jurisdiction, 93 and
allows for execution on a judgment.9 4 Under H.R. 3493, service in district court shall be made upon a foreign or political subdivision and may
be made on a foreign state's agency or instrumentality "which is not a
citizen of the United States" 95 by sending a copy of the summons and
complaint by registered or certified mail to the ambassador or chief of
the mission of a foreign state. If the United States has no diplomatic
relations with a state, then the summons and complaint can be sent in
the same way to the chief of mission of another state acting on -behalf
of that foreign state. For service on an agency or instrumentality, the
89. § 1607(1). The section deals with counterclaims as defined by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 13 (a and b), 28 U.S.C. [hereinafter cited as FED.
R. Civ. P.]
90. RESTATEMENT 11 § 70.
91. The Department of State presented this view to the New York courts in
1961. Stephen v. Zivnostenska Banka, 15 App. Div. 2d 111, 116, 222 N.Y.S.2d 128
(1961). "The Department of State is of the further view that, where under international law a foreign government is not immune from suit, attachment of its property
for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction is not prohibited .... But property so attached to obtain jurisdiction over the defendant government cannot be retained to
satisfy a judgment ensuing from the suit." Id.
92. § 1608.
93. Hearings at 15. The proposed bill's basis of jurisdiction is faithful to International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
94. § 1610.
95. See p. 1240 for discussion of alternative means of service on agencies or
instrumentalities of foreign states infra.
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summons and complaint may be sent to the agent who is authorized to
receive service under the law of the foreign state or of the United States.
In addition, two copies of the summons and of the complaint must be
sent by registered or certified mail to the Secretary of State who will
transmit one of these copies to the office charged with the conduct of
foreign affairs for the foreign state. 9 6
Questions as to whether diplomatic immunity is violated by this
method of serving process are resolved by the fact that diplomatic immunity refers to the "person of the foreign official" and not to the foreign
state. 97 So long as the personnel and the premises of the diplomatic mission remain inviolate as required by the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations,9" service may take place through the mail system.
Nothing in the Convention forbids service of process by mail. In fact,
the International Law Commission in its Report of the Tenth Session, reported "there is nothing to prevent service through the post if it can be
effected in that way." 99
Section 1608 creates an alternative means of service on agencies or instrumentalities of foreign states' 0 0 because they can already be served under Rule 4(d)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure even if they
do carry on transactions for the sovereign state. The Federal Rules have
no definitive method or provision, however, for service on the foreign
state or its political subdivisions or its diplomatic and consular representatives. The Rules only provide for service on "domestic or foreign corporation[s]."'' 1 Under H.R. 3493, then, service on the foreign state or
its political subdivision is mandatory while service on the agency or instrumentality of the foreign state is permissible.
Dexter & Carpenter, Inc. v. Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsenheld that the assets of a foreign state are immune from execution' 02 and § 1609 reiterates
that rule except as specified in § 1610. The assets of a foreign state
will not be immune from execution "to the extent that they are used for
a particular commercial activity in the United States"' 03 if the execution
96. § 1608.
97. Lowenfeld at 934.
98. 500 U.N.T.S. 95, 106, 112 (Articles 22 and 31).
99. U.N. Doc. 13 GAOR Supp. 9, 17, U.N. Doc. A/3859 (1958).
100. Hearings at 44. This is what § 1603(a) was referring to in excepting §
1608 from defining agency or instrumentality as a foreign state. See discussion in
text at notes 69-71 supra.
101. FED.R. Civ. P. 4(d)(3).
102. 43 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 896 (1931).
103. § 1610(a).
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relates to a claim ",based on that commercial activity or on rights in property taken in violation of international law . .
-. o4 If the state has
waived its immunity from attachment or execution then the assets can
be used for a judgment. 105 Otherwise, only those assets of the foreign
state relating to the commercial activity are subject to execution.
In contradistinction to that framework stands § 1610(b). If any
agency or instrumentality of a state engages in a commercial activity in
the United States or does an act inside or outside the United States but
that act is related to a commercial activity elsewhere and has a direct
effect whithin the United States, then any or all of the assets of the
agency or instrumentality are subject to an execution. However, the execution must relate to a claim based on a commercial activity in the United
States or to rights in property taken in violation of international law.' 0 6
If the agency or instrumentality waives immunity, attachment for execution purposes is permitted. 1 7 Even though the assets of the agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state do not arise out of the particular commercial activity which gives rise to the suit, those assets are not immune
from execution.
The final part of section one of H.R. 3493, § 1611, is an attempt to
prevent adversity in the balance of payments by retaining immunity for
certain assets, despite § 1610. The assets of a "foreign central bank"' 0 8
would be immune as would assets held in the United States in connection
with a military activity or assets which are of a military character or which
are under military control. 10 9
The impact of §§ 1609 and 1610 would be to give greater effect to
the application of international law as applied in domestic courts, providing a remedy for parties who have heretofore suffered without any recourse. By comparison, the European Convention on State Immunity" 0
is weak in its enforcement application and it has been criticized for that
reason."' There are those who feel any form of enforcement or execution provisions would be detrimental because it might encourage the
104. § 1610(a)(1).
105. § 1610(a)(2).
106. § 1610(b)(1).
107. § 1610(b)(2).
108. § 1611(1).
109. § 1611(2).
110. 11 INT'L LEGAL MATmumS 470 (1972).
111. Comment, Sovereign Immunity from Judicial Enforcement: The Impact of
the European Convention on State Immunity, 12 COLum. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 130
(1973).
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executive department to intervene on behalf of a foreign state 1 2 or a foreign state might be discouraged from investing in the United States.
The execution provisions of H.R. 3493, however, are clearly limited
to commercial activities. The importance of providing for a remedy at
law where one does not exist is of more serious concern than unproved
investment fears.
International law has not always effectively dealt with enforcement of
judgments against a foreign state to the extent that is warranted. The
proposed legislation is treading new ground by allowing for enforcement
but it is not departing from the thrust of restrictive immunity in any way.
Eventually the concept of restrictive immunity must come to mean, as
H.R. 3493 would mean, not only restricted jurisdictional immunity under
international law but also restricted enforcement immunity.
B.

Sections Two through Five of H.R. 3493

Sections two through five of H.R. 3493 would add one new section,
1330, Actions against foreign states," to Title 28 and amend three
other sections.
Section 1330 would give the federal district courts original jurisdiction
over actions against foreign states or their political subdivisions or against
the agencies or instrumentalities of either (except those agencies or instrumentalities which are United States citizens). The amount in controversy
would be of no requisite concern. 113 The section would permit state
courts to preside over a suit involving a foreign state, but either party
could remove the suit to federal court. Original jurisdiction would be
given to the federal courts because they are more likely to have knowl14
edge of international legal principles and would apply them uniformly.
Section 1330(b) is simply an assurance that jurisdiction over agencies or
instrumentalities of foreign states which are citizens of the United States,
as defined by statute, 115 would not be affected by § 1330.
In order to facilitate venue, the Rodino Bill would amend § 1391 of
Title 28 by adding a subsection (f).116 An action against a foreign state,
"§

112. Lowenfeld at 930.
113. H.R. 3493, Section Two.
114. "The duty to apply it [international law] is one imposed upon the United
States as an international person. The several states of the Union are entities unknown to international law. It would be as unsound as it would be unwise to make
our state courts our ultimate authority for pronouncing the rules of international
law." Jessup, The Doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins Applied to International
Law, 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 740, 743 (1939).
115. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) and (d) (1970).

116. H.R. 3493, Section Three.
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political subdivision or agency or instrumentality not an American citizen
could be brought in a judicial district (1) where the act or substantial
portion of the events giving rise to the claim occurred, (2) where the
property which is the subject of the suit is located, (3) where the agency
or instrumentality is licensed to do business, or (4) in the District of Columbia where it would be easiest to defend if the action is against a foreign state or political subdivision. Again, agencies or instrumentalities
which are citizens of the United States will not be affected in terms of
venue. There is nothing in the provision to prevent the doctrine of forum
non conveniens from operating whether the defendant is invoking the doctrine to move the suit to another district or to dismiss "the action subject
to a court in a foreign State taking jurisdiction .... -117 The fourth
section of the bill would amend § 1441 of Title 28 by adding a new subsection (d) which provides for removal to federal courts from state courts.
The final section of the proposed legislation would amend § 1332(a)
by striking (2) and (3) and substituting "(2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state; and (3) citizens of different States
and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign state are additional
parties." 118 The effect would be the removal of "foreign states" as parties from § 1332 which grants original jurisdiction to federal courts on
the 'basis of diversity of citizenship and where the amount in controversy
exceeds $10,000. This would be done because the new § 1330 would
give original jurisdiction to federal district courts where a foreign state
is a party to a suit without a required $10,000 being in controversy. 119
III.

CONCLUSION:

COMPARISON AND CONTRIBUTION

The unique qualities of H.R. 3493 might be more easily recognized
by comparing the Bill to other nations' practice of granting immunity.
Although the European Convention on State Immunity120 isa source of
international law,' 2 ' it is nevertheless a regional convention and is more
22
realistically compared with H.R. 3493 as an example of foreign law.'
The Convention is clearer than the Rodino Bill in its specification of
117.

Hearings at 48.

118. Compare with 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a)(2) and (3)(1970).
119. H.R.3493, Section Five.
120. 11 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 470 (1972).
121. Mann, New Developments in the Law of Sovereign Immunity, 36 MOD. L.
REv. 18, 24 (1973).
122. Restrictive immunity is not universally accepted as international law al-

though it does seem to be accepted by most nations.
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what acts are not to be accorded immunity12 3 but the Convention's various articles qualify the restrictive immunity and allow numerous exceptions.
A notable difference between the proposed bill and the Convention is
the Convention's lack of provisions for execution. The presence of execution provisions in H.R. 3493124 will, no doubt, cause interesting and

stimulating-if not startling-debate in the event of an international convention on state immunity. Another significant difference is the fact that
in the European Convention, political subdivisions of a foreign state are
not accorded any immunity 12 5 unlike H.R. 3493 where a political subdivision would be defined as a "foreign state."'1 26
Yet there are, apparently, two essential similarities. Both leave it to
the courts to decide a question of immunity; and both attempt to curtail
*aforeign state's jurisdictional immunity.
The only other regional consideration given to restrictive immunity was
by the Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee at its Third Session
in Colombo, Sri Lanka in 1960. The Committee issued a report of its
findings which were not binding except as the report may express a customary international legal obligation. The participants did acknowledge
their acceptance of restrictive immunity, however, and, for this reason,
127
it is of comparative interest.
The final report of the Committee expressed views similar to H.R.
3493 on the refusal to grant immunity to states for activities of a private
or commercial nature and to trading organizations which are a part of
or are related to a foreign state.' 28 However, the Final Report of the
Session stated that the "certification" of immunity by the foreign office
should be binding on the courts1 29 and this is where it differs from both
the European Convention and the Rodino Bill. Finally, immunity from
execution on a judgment is to be accorded a foreign state and in this
the Asian-African Report is like the European Convention and unlike the
,House Bill on jurisdictional immunity., 30
123.
11

Council of Europe: European Convention on State Immunity, Articles 1-15,
470 (1972).

INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS

124.

§ 1610.

125.

European Convention, Article 28.

126.
127.

H.R. 3493, § 1603.
General acknowledgment of a principle of international law can be taken

as a customary principle.
128. Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee, 3d Sess. (Colombo 1960) 67.
129.

Id.

130.

Id. at 68.

1974]

LEGISLATIVE NOTE

1245

H.R. 3493 is of importance to the international legal community because it would clarify the approach of the United States to -the question
of immunity. Not only would it contribute to international law by expressly adopting what many other nations have recognized and accepted
either as customary practice or as binding conventional law-that is, restricted jurisdictional immunity-but the Bill would break new ground by
providing for restricted enforcement immunity. The provisions for execution would give meaning to the entire question of jurisdictional immunity.
The execution provisions of H.R. 3493 closely follow and parallel the jurisdictional provisions. The Bill offers a viable, workable solution in an
area of law noted for its lack of enforcement capability.
13
Another significant contribution, one which others have advocated, '
(would be to enlist the courts, noted for their independence, as domestic
instruments of international law.132 No nation will rely on another nation's application of international law so long as the judicial branch defers
to the executive branch which is, in turn, responsible for the conduct of
foreign affairs and whose judgments are likely to be influenced by political considerations. Once the courts are effectively free of the executive
department, domestic courts could be trusted to apply international law
justly. This in itself would be a significant contribution to the development of the international legal order which has, over the years, been seen
as a necessity in the American tradition. Thomas Jefferson wrote, "[t]he
1 33
law of nations makes an integral part . . . of the laws of the land."

The Bill is in furtherance of this tradition.
Although the Rodino Bill may be "looked upon as an arrangement to
be applied until such time as a satisfactory convention is drawn up and
the United States becomes a party to it,"'13 4 H.R. 3493 would help clear
the way for such an international convention. The Secretary of State
and the Attorney General, in the letter to the Speaker of the House which
accompanied the draft bill (H.R. 3493), went on to say that should the
Bill be accepted, the Department of State would propose that the United
States declare its acceptance of "the compulsory jurisdiction of the Inter131.

See, e.g., R. FALK, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL

LEGAL ORDER

(1964).

132. "The central principle of the draft bill is to make the question of a foreign
state's entitlement to immunity an issue justiciable by the courts, without participation by the Department of State. As the situation now stands, the courts normally
from Rogers and Kleindefer to the views of the Department of State.... .Letter
dienst, Hearings at 34.
133. J. MOORE, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST 10 (1906).
134. Letter from Rogers and Kleindienst, Hearings at 35.
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national Court of Justice, on condition of reciprocity, with respect to disputes [over] immunity . .. .,11
The positive and essential effect that H.R. 3493 would have on domes-

tic law would be a clarification of the question of separation of powers.
The proposed bill would also facilitate foreign relations 'by freeing the Department of State
from pressures by foreign states to suggest immunity and from any adverse
consequences resulting from the unwillingness of the Department to suggest immunity. The Department would be in a position to assert that the
8 6
question of immunity is entirely one for the courts.'

FerdinandMesch

135.
136.

Id.
Id. at 34.

